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COMPARING ALASKA’S OIL PRODUCTION TAXES: 
 INCENTIVES AND ASSUMPTIONS1 
Matthew Berman 
In a recent analysis comparing the current oil production tax, More Alaska Production 
Act (MAPA, also known as SB 21) to the tax it replaced, Alaska’s Clear and Equitable 
Share (ACES), Scott Goldsmith, professor emeritus of economics at ISER, found that 
MAPA would produce higher revenues in the future, if changing to MAPA causes 
producers to make investments that lead to more production than would have occurred 
under ACES.2 
Professor Goldsmith did not advocate for either tax, but projected effects of each under 
a range of different future oil prices, production rates, and costs. He noted that 
comparative revenues are highly sensitive to future costs and oil prices. Oil prices are 
notoriously difficult to forecast. Future North Slope oil production, as well as lease costs 
that can be deducted from producers’ tax liabilities under both ACES and MAPA, are 
also highly uncertain. Proponents of either MAPA or ACES appear to make assumptions 
about prices, production, and costs that support their arguments. 
Given the inherent uncertainty about oil prices, new production, and expenditures for 
capital and operating costs, what assumptions would be most reasonable to make for 
assessing outcomes of the tax regimes? This note critically examines the relevant 
assumptions for projecting tax outcomes, and explores how the different taxes compare 
under a set of assumptions that seem most reasonable, given our best current 
information. 
The comparisons address not only the amount of revenue the state would collect, but 
also how the taxes differently share risk between the industry and the state, and 
administrative issues affecting the nature of the relationship between the oil industry and 
state government. The analysis also places the debate about MAPA vs. ACES in the 
longer term context of Alaska oil production taxes, comparing MAPA and ACES to the 
original petroleum profits tax (PPT) that preceded ACES, and to the old severance tax 
PPT replaced.
                                                            
1
  This research was funded in part by ISER's Investing for Alaska's Future research 
initiative, under a grant from Northrim Bank. The findings are those of the author, not of ISER, the 
University of Alaska Anchorage, or Northrim Bank. 
2  Scott Goldsmith, “Alaska's Oil Production Tax: Comparing the Old and the New,” ISER 
Web Note No. 17, May 2014. 
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Major Findings 
• Since Prudhoe Bay production started in the 1970s, Alaska state government has 
generally collected between 30 and 40 cents of every dollar of gross wellhead 
production value. The percentage state take exceeded 45 percent of gross wellhead 
value, however, for two of the six years under ACES when oil prices were high. The 
state take under MAPA currently falls within the 30-40 percent range, but could fall 
below the 30 percent threshold as production from new fields takes an increasing 
share of North Slope production. 
• The assumptions about prices and costs that Professor Goldsmith used for his 
analysis are similar to those projected by the Alaska Department of Revenue Tax 
Division for fiscal year 2015 in the most recent comprehensive revenue forecast, 
published in spring 2014.3 Projected lease capital costs are much higher for that year 
than for previous years. Much if not all of the increased capital expenditure is related 
to one-time development expenditures for the Pt. Thomson field, as part of a 
negotiated settlement of a lease dispute with the state that has nothing to do with oil 
taxes. 
• Rather than basing cost assumptions on one-time development activities, this 
analysis uses cost assumptions based on Department of Revenue assumptions for 
the next five years—which better reflect likely future conditions. Under those 
assumptions, ACES would collect $1.3 billion more than MAPA over the next five 
years—a difference of about 12 percent. 
• Oil prices will likely fluctuate in the future as they have in the past. The progressive 
rate structure of ACES causes it to collect more revenue relative to MAPA when 
there is greater volatility of oil prices. ACES would collect 6 percent more revenue if 
the oil price averaged $100 per barrel but fluctuated between $80 and $120 than if it 
stayed constant at $100, while MAPA revenues would be essentially unchanged if 
the price fluctuated. 
• No independent evidence exists that changing from ACES to MAPA has caused or 
will cause oil industry investment to increase. Replacing the tax credit for capital 
expenditures in ACES with a tax credit for production (per-barrel credit) in MAPA 
eliminates a risk-sharing mechanism while offering producers an inefficient incentive 
to increase production. The same loss of state revenue under MAPA as under ACES 
gives an oil company a less valuable benefit, because the firm doesn’t get the 
production credit until many years after it incurs the investment expenses. 
 
Alaska Oil Production Taxes in Historical Context 
Ballot Measure One offers the first opportunity for Alaska voters to have a direct role in 
determining Alaska oil revenues. However, the debate over MAPA versus ACES 
represents only the latest round of a political conversation that has continued since 
Prudhoe Bay oil started flowing through the trans-Alaska pipeline (TAPS) nearly 40 
years ago. When analyzing trends in oil taxes over a long period of time, it is important 
                                                            
3  Revenue Sources Book: 2014 Spring. Alaska Department of Revenue, Tax Division. 
http://www.tax.alaska.gov/programs/documentviewer/viewer.aspx?1048r (retrieved July 10, 
2014). 
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to keep in mind that governments obtain petroleum revenues by exercising two 
fundamentally different roles. As a sovereign entity, the state can tax activities within its 
borders. As a landowner, the state can accept payments from oil companies for the 
rights to exploit resources that the state owns. Such landowner payments often come in 
the form of lease revenues such as bonus bids and royalties, since states typically lease 
rights to exploit oil and gas rather than sell the resource deposits outright. The petroleum 
fiscal regime is the term often used to refer to the entire portfolio of lease and tax 
mechanisms that share revenue or other valuable resources between the oil industry 
and the government.  
THE PETROLEUM FISCAL REGIME 
People often confuse the different nature of the revenues accruing from the two separate 
state roles. The United States is one of the few nations in the world where petroleum 
rights may be owned by private parties such as farmers, ranchers, and Alaska Native 
regional corporations. Nearly everywhere else, only governments may own mineral 
rights, so the difference between landowner and sovereign is easily blurred. In the 
United States, however, it is important to keep the two forms of revenue separate. While 
a sovereign may change taxes unilaterally at any time, lease payments, once 
established, are essentially contracts, and may only be changed by mutual agreement. 
Figure 1 summarizes annual Alaska state petroleum revenues by major revenue 
category since statehood in 1959. The figures are adjusted for inflation to represent 
2013 price levels using the U.S. Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator. The 
figure shows clearly that since fiscal year 1982, royalties and production taxes have 
provided the vast majority of petroleum revenues. (Alaska fiscal year 1982 started July 
1, 1981 and ended June 30, 1982.) In fiscal year 1970, Alaska collected $900 million in 
bonus bids from a single North Slope lease sale—an amount worth more than $4 billion 
in today’s dollars. The figure also illustrates the volatility of Alaska’s oil revenue. 
Inflation-adjusted revenues were one-fourth as large in 1999 as in 1982, due to low oil 
prices as well as declining production. Since 1999, revenues have recovered, but 
fluctuating oil prices, combined with a revised production tax structure, have generated 
even more inter-annual volatility. 
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Figure 1. 
Real Alaska State Petroleum Revenues, 1959-2013
Source: Alaska DOR Tax Division
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Detailed tax and lease terms can be highly complex, so it can be useful to summarize 
and evaluate the petroleum fiscal regime along three dimensions: government take, risk 
sharing, and administrative distance. Ideally, the government take should be measured 
as the state’s share of economic rent.4 However, defining and obtaining consistent, 
objective measurements of capital and operating costs over a long period of time or 
across different geographic areas is very difficult. Consequently, a much simpler, if 
potentially less accurate measure of government take, is state revenues expressed as a 
ratio or percentage of the total wellhead market value of production. 
It may often seem from the political rhetoric that the government take is the only 
important issue in the fiscal regime. However, the other two dimensions of the fiscal 
regime—the way the regime shares revenue risk between the government and industry 
and the nature of the government-industry relationship—may be equally important. 
Oil development is an inherently risky proposition, involving a wide range of geological, 
economic, and political uncertainties, and the fiscal regime provides an opportunity to 
transfer some of that risk from one party to the other. Risk-sharing is closely linked to the 
                                                            
4  Economic rent for a natural resource is defined as the value of production less the value 
of the capital and labor required to achieve that production. Economic rent for oil and gas typically 
excludes operating and capital costs but includes payments to landowners and taxes such as 
production taxes that the oil industry pays but most other industries do not pay, as well as profits 
from resource production that exceed competitive returns. 
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concept of progressivity, which refers to the degree to which the government take 
increases as the returns from development increase (see box below). The percentage 
government take from a progressive fiscal regime is higher if investment in an oil 
prospect turns out to be very lucrative than if it turns out to be less profitable. The 
opposite is true for a regressive regime: the percentage take is higher from a given 
prospect if returns are lower. Progressive regimes therefore shift some of the oilfield risk 
from industry to the government, while regressive regimes shield the government from 
risk and instead shift more risk to industry. 
 
PROGRESSIVE, NEUTRAL, AND REGRESSIVE TAXES 
A progressive tax collects a higher percentage of net income at a higher level of income 
than it collects at a lower income level. For a tax to be considered progressive, the tax 
rate has to rise as income rises.  
A regressive tax has the opposite effect: the percentage of net income taxed is lower 
when income is higher. 
A neutral tax collects the same percentage of income at all income levels.  
A constant percentage tax on gross wellhead production value is a regressive tax, 
because it does not take costs into account. If higher oil prices cause gross wellhead 
value to rise by 10 percent, for example, net income (after subtracting costs) rises by 
more than 10 percent. The production tax levied on gross value goes down as a 
percentage of net income. 
In comparison with gross revenues taxes and other regressive taxes, profit taxes shift 
risk from companies to the state. Progressive profits taxes shift even more risk from 
companies to the state. 
 
Table 1 summarizes common petroleum tax and lease mechanisms by categories of 
progressivity. Highly regressive instruments collect revenue that is unrelated or even 
inversely related to production, shielding the government from risk while increasing risk 
for industry. Highly regressive lease payments include bonus bids (lump sum payments) 
and rental fees. Examples of highly regressive taxes include property taxes (if based on 
physical investments) and reserves taxes. Basing the payment on production value 
rather than physical production quantity moderates the regressive nature somewhat, but 
does not eliminate it as long as costs are ignored. Taxes based on a fixed percentage of 
net income and lease payments based on a fixed share of net profits are neutral, with 
relatively little effect on the investor’s risk pattern one way or the other. For progressive 
mechanisms, the rate on net income or share of net profits rises as the percentage 
return rises. 
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Table 1. Relative Progressivity of Different Lease Payments and Taxes 
Progressivity class Explanation Lease terms Taxes 
Highly regressive Revenue unrelated 
or negatively related 
to production 
Bonus bids, rental 
payments, work 
commitments 
Property tax, 
reserves tax 
Moderately 
regressive 
Based on 
production, ignoring 
price or cost 
Fixed dollar per 
barrel royalty 
Apportioned income 
tax, fixed dollar per 
barrel tax 
Somewhat 
regressive 
Based on gross 
production value, 
ignoring cost 
Fixed percentage 
ad valorem royalty 
Fixed rate ad 
valorem severance 
tax 
Neutral Fixed percentage of 
net income 
Fixed net profit 
share 
Fixed rate producer 
profits tax 
Progressive Percentage of net 
income rises as 
income rises 
Variable rate net 
profit share 
Variable rate 
producer profits tax, 
producer profits tax 
with investment 
credit 
 
The third fiscal dimension, administrative distance, qualitatively expresses the degree to 
which governments act unilaterally to determine the fiscal regime, versus negotiate 
terms jointly with industry. Jurisdictions around the world differ dramatically in their 
approach to administrative distance. In some countries, national oil companies 
participate in joint ventures or as equity partners with private firms, while in others, such 
as most U.S. states, governments approach industry only on an arm’s-length basis.5 
Table 2 summarizes processes for determining and implementing taxes and lease terms 
in the fiscal regime under three levels of administrative distance. High and low 
administrative distance each have advantages and disadvantages. Low distance 
provides parties with the opportunity to be more flexible with developing the fiscal regime 
and adjusting it over time as conditions evolve. High distance, on the other hand, 
provides greater certainty for investors—provided the state does not change the terms— 
and reduces opportunities for corruption of public officials. A fiscal regime with low 
distance can operate in the public interest if there is both a high level of public trust and 
a depth of professional expertise in the civil service working on petroleum lease and tax 
administration. 
 
                                                            
5 Kenneth W. Dam, in his book Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1976) compared the government take and administrative distance of North Sea 
fiscal regimes with that of the U.S. federal Outer Continental Shelf in the 1960s and 1970s. He 
concluded that the government take from the arm’s-length U.S. auction system would be likely be 
higher than from the European negotiated licensing systems. Because Dam’s analysis largely 
ignored the effects of the risk-sharing provisions of the different systems, his findings might have 
differed if he had considered performance under the upheavals in world oil markets that began 
shortly after his book was published. 
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Table 2. Administrative Distance of Industry-Government Relations 
Distance of relationship Lease terms Taxes 
High Competitive lease auctions, 
state sets lease terms and 
bid method 
State sets tax regime 
unilaterally 
Medium Solicitation of competitive 
development proposals 
Industry participates in 
drafting proposals for tax 
changes; legislature may 
amend before ratification 
Low Negotiated development 
and revenue terms, 
government participation as 
equity investor 
Negotiated settlements of 
tax disputes 
 
Political ideologies, economic interests, and changing opportunities are constantly 
attempting to push the regime towards one direction or the other along all three 
dimensions of the fiscal regime. Opposing forces favor more or less government take, 
more or less progressivity, and more or less administrative distance. The prevailing 
regime is therefore a political equilibrium of these forces over time, similar in many ways 
to a market price that represents an equilibrium of supply and demand. 
 
Historical Trends in Government Take,  
Progressivity, and Administrative Distance 
Tables 3 summarizes major changes in Alaska's oil and gas fiscal regime with respect to 
government take, risk sharing, and administrative distance since North Slope oil started 
to be developed. Changes that involved large amounts of state revenue are highlighted 
for emphasis. Even before oil was discovered on Alaska’s North Slope, Cook Inlet oil 
and gas provided one-fourth of state General Fund revenues, mostly in the form of 
bonus and royalty payments from state offshore leases and shared federal revenues 
from onshore production.6 Since North Slope oil began flowing through the trans-Alaska 
pipeline (TAPS) in 1977, the legislature has faced the challenge of how to collect a “fair 
share” of the enormous rent from the giant fields while providing sufficient incentives for 
new exploration and development. For nearly three decades after 1977, the state relied 
on a production, or severance tax, with a variable rate determined by the so-called 
economic limit factor (ELF) based on average daily production per well. After a 
significant change in the corporate income tax in 1981, the legislature made a number of 
relatively minor adjustments to the system without changing the basic structure of the 
severance tax. These changes had the cumulative effect of making the Alaska fiscal 
regime increasingly regressive, but with decreased distance. 
                                                            
6  Jerry McBeath, Matthew Berman, Jonathan Rosenberg, and Mary Ehrlander, Political 
Economy of Oil in Alaska: Multinationals vs. the State (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2008) contains a more detailed history of changes in the state’s petroleum fiscal regime. 
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As Prudhoe Bay oil production declined in the 1990s, the ELF formula began to reduce 
the effective tax rate significantly. By 2003, the effective tax rate was less than half the 
nominal rate of 15 percent of wellhead value, and even the oil companies recognized 
that the tax structure was unsustainable in its current form. Pushed by Governor Frank 
Murkowski and his tax consultant Pedro Van Meurs, the Alaska Legislature in 2006 
enacted a major change in the oil and gas production tax, replacing the ELF-based 
severance taxes on gross wellhead value with the so-called petroleum profits tax, or 
PPT, a tax on net income earned at the wellhead.  
The PPT was progressive as initially enacted, and was amended the next year under 
Governor Sarah Palin to increase both the government take and progressivity. The 2007 
tax, called “Alaska’s Clear and Equitable Share” (ACES), remained in effect until 
replaced in 2013 by the “More Alaska Production Act” (MAPA). MAPA retained the 
concept of a profits-based production tax, but substantially reduced progressivity and 
introduced lower tax rates for production from “new” fields. 
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Table 3. Major Changes in Alaska’s Oil and Gas Fiscal Regime, 1973-2013a 
Year	   Authority	   Brief	  description	   Administrative	  
distance	  
Effect	  on	  
state	  take	  
Risk-­‐sharing	  effect	  
1973 AS43.56 Enact property tax High Increase Highly regressive 
1975 AS43.58 Reserves tax 
(temporary) 
High Exceeds 
100% 
Highly regressive 
1977 AS43.55 Severance tax with 
ELF 
High Large 
increase 
Somewhat regressive 
1978 AS 43.21 Separate accounting 
income tax 
High Large 
increase 
Change from 
regressive to neutral 
1979 AS38.05 Expanded lease 
bidding options 
High Neutral Options to increase 
progressivity used in 
major lease sale 
1981 AS 43.55; 
AS 43.20; 
repeal AS 
43.21 
Change income tax 
and severance tax 
High Decrease From neutral to 
regressive 
1989 AS 43.55 Change in ELF High Increase Regressive 
1990 AS 38.05 Royalty reduction 
option 
Decrease Decrease Less regressive 
1994 AS 43.55 Make hazardous 
release tax 
permanent 
High Increase Regressive 
1994 AS 38.05 Exploration licensing, 
credit 
Decrease Decrease Progressive 
1986-
2000 
Attorney 
general 
Settlement of major 
tax and royalty 
disputes 
Low Unknown Highly regressive 
1996 Ch. 139 
SLA 
1996 
Northstar lease 
renegotiation 
Low Neutral Change from 
progressive to 
regressive 
1998 AS 43.82  Stranded Gas 
Development Act 
Decrease Decrease Neutral 
2003 AS 55.025 Exploration tax credit 
expanded 
Decrease Decrease Progressive 
2005 Administra-
tive 
Aggregation of small 
field ELF 
High Increase Neutral 
2006 AS 43.55 Petroleum Profits Tax 
(Profit-based 
Production Tax) 
Moderate Neutral Change from 
regressive to 
progressive 
2007 AS 43.90 Alaska Gasline 
Inducement Act 
Low Neutral Progressive 
2007 AS 43.55 Alaska’s Clear and 
Equitable Share 
(ACES) Production 
Tax 
Moderate Increase Slightly more 
progressive 
2013 AS 43.55 More Alaska 
Production Act 
(MAPA) 
Moderate Decrease Less progressive 
aAdapted from Jerry McBeath, Matthew Berman, Jonathan Rosenberg, and Mary Ehrlander, Political 
Economy of Oil in Alaska: Multinationals vs. the State (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008) 
 
When expressed as a percentage of wellhead oil and gas production value, the Alaska 
state government take has been relatively constant over time, as Figure 2 illustrates. 
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While most petroleum revenues are assessed annually, certain revenues such as lease 
bonus bids are one-time events. The inherently sporadic and unpredictable nature of 
these one-time revenues presents a challenge to representing government take over 
time. In Figure 2 these non-recurring revenues are amortized—essentially spreading 
them out over time—in proportion to the percentage of total oil production occurring each 
year. The lower line in Figure 2 shows the percentage of wellhead value collected by all 
revenues except bonus and rental payments, with the 1976-1977 conservation tax 
(prepayment of Prudhoe Bay severance taxes before production started), and legal 
settlements of tax and royalty disputes represented by their amortized values.7 The 
upper line adds the percentage of wellhead value in amortized bonus and rental 
payments.  
Figure 2. 
Alaska State Petroleum Revenues as a Percentage of 
Wellhead Value
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The spike in the state take per barrel in the 1970s is due to North Slope and TAPS 
petroleum property taxes collected before Prudhoe Bay began commercial production, 
and the wellhead value was composed almost entirely of Cook Inlet oil and gas. Once 
North Slope commercial production started, the take stabilized at a higher percentage of 
wellhead value than before. During the 1980s and 1990s, the state take was nearly 
constant at about 30 percent of wellhead value in recurring revenues and 35-40 percent, 
considering all petroleum revenues. During the entire period through fiscal year 2006, 
when the ELF-based severance tax was in effect, the state take from all petroleum 
revenues never reached 45 percent. The years with the highest take all corresponded to 
                                                            
7  Recognizing the erratic nature of legal settlements, the Alaska Legislature has directed 
that these funds be placed in the Constitutional Budget Reserve Fund, where they are more 
difficult to access for current spending. 
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years of low oil prices, illustrating the regressive nature of the overall fiscal regime. 
However, the state take exceeded 45 percent of gross wellhead value in both 2008 and 
2012 under the ACES production tax. Oil prices adjusted for inflation reached their 
highest levels in these years, illustrating the effect of the highly progressive rate 
structure of the ACES tax structure. 
As the percentage government take increases, fewer investments in enhanced recovery, 
exploration, and development remain profitable, suggesting that production over the long 
term could fall. Oil producers obviously have an incentive to argue that reducing 
government take leads to higher investment and production. Determining the validity of 
these claims independently is difficult, due to the many uncertainties in the oil business, 
and objective empirical evidence is lacking. A complicating factor is that the expected 
government take is not the only aspect of a tax that affects profitability of new investment 
and, by implication, future production. The way the fiscal regime shares risk also 
matters.  
REVENUE RISK (PROGRESSIVITY) 
Figure 3 shows the Alaska state government take distributed among the various 
categories of progressivity. The height of the graph—the total take as a percent of 
wellhead value—is the same as the top line in Figure 2. Figure 3 illustrates how 
moderately regressive sources—mainly royalties and severance taxes—dominated state 
revenue collections until 2006, when the PPT replaced the ELF-based severance tax. 
The first of two previous anomalies occurred during TAPS construction, when the 
reserves tax and pipeline property taxes increased highly regressive revenues before 
North Slope commercial production commenced. The second anomaly came right 
afterward during the first few years of North Slope production, when the state used the 
“separate accounting” method for the petroleum corporate income tax. The progressive 
features of the PPT and ACES meant that the state was poised to benefit from the 
historically high oil prices that have occurred since 2006. 
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Figure 3. 
Alaska State Government Take by Progressivity of Revenue Source
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TRADE-OFF OF RISK AND EXPECTED RETURN 
One would ordinarily assume that for any given expected government take, the state 
would prefer a fiscal regime generating lower revenue risk to one generating higher risk. 
Less predictable revenues, or wider fluctuations in revenues, creates challenges for 
budgeting and raises the prospect of revenue shortfalls. Governments therefore would 
generally give up some expected revenue if they could shift more of the risk from oil 
revenues to industry. The degree of preference for a risk-expected-return tradeoff would 
depend on such factors as the amount of government debt and size of state savings 
accounts relative to the annual budget, amount and volatility of non-petroleum sources 
of revenue, financial returns from investing surplus government funds, and interest rates 
in bond markets. An administration with less ability to weather uncertainty of petroleum 
revenues would be willing to give up more expected revenue to reduce its revenue 
volatility than would a state with a more diversified revenue base. 
Oil companies, too, would have a similar tradeoff of risk for expected return. The firm 
would presumably be willing to give up some amount of expected revenue if the state 
were to share some of the risk of exploration and development investments. The tradeoff 
of risk for expected return is a common assumption in finance. It underlies the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model that has been a staple of portfolio analysis, or modern portfolio 
theory, since the 1960s. The degree of the tradeoff depends on the ability of the oil 
companies to take on risk, which of course differs among oil companies as well as 
between the industry and the state. The private company might compare expected 
return and its uncertainty from oil and gas investments in one jurisdiction to expected 
return and uncertainty from investments in other jurisdictions, as well as from financial 
returns available to in the securities markets. The company’s asset portfolio affects the 
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amount of additional expected return that investors in securities markets would require 
for a change in the risk. 
Large international integrated oil companies typically have a much more diversified 
portfolio of investments than small independent firms, leading them to place much less 
value on sharing risk with the government. The more favorable portfolio risk of major oil 
firms influences them towards favoring more regressive tax and lease terms. More 
regressive instruments allow them not only to pay less expected revenue to the state, 
but also help them compete more aggressively against smaller independent firms. 
ADMINISTRATIVE DISTANCE 
The broad pattern that emerges from Table 3 shows a steady decline in administrative 
distance since the beginning of the North Slope era. The change is likely due to a 
combination of factors. First, the Alaska state government has built up a significant 
expertise over the years in a number of areas related to the oil and gas industry in the 
departments of Revenue, Natural Resources, and Law. The cadre of expertise gives the 
state much greater ability to participate in negotiations with industry on an ongoing basis 
rather than having to rely as much on hired outside consultants retained for project-
specific tasks. Second, as the state government became dependent on the oil industry 
for public revenues, the industry has likewise become dependent on the state for access 
to resources, as the vast majority of oil reserves discovered since Alaska became a 
state have been found on state-owned lands. 
This mutual dependence has certainly increased the incentives for developing a more 
cooperative relationship. Perhaps most important, however, is the decision the major oil 
companies operating the main North Slope fields made in the early 1980s to build 
regional headquarters in Anchorage, move thousands of permanent employees to 
Alaska, and develop relationships with local contractors to support North Slope 
operations. This change embedded the oil industry as an integral part of the state 
economy, fostering an important shift in public perception from the early days, when it 
was viewed more as an outside interest group seeking to profit from Alaska’s resource 
wealth. 
The combined effect of these factors has been to increase the degree to which the state 
government tends to seek to negotiate rather than fight over terms of the relationship 
with oil companies. The reduced friction has undoubtedly brought savings in litigation 
expenses to both sides. However, since detailed terms of contracts and legal 
settlements remain confidential, the climate of reduced administrative distance has also 
caused a significant loss of transparency in government. The loss of transparency has a 
cost, too, of increasing the likelihood of political corruption—or more importantly, the 
perception of corruption, whether or not it occurs in practice.  
Projecting Effects of Different Production Taxes  
Professor Goldsmith concluded in Web Note 17 that MAPA could generate more 
revenue than ACES under a wide range of assumptions. However, not all those 
assumptions are equally likely to occur in practice. Research carried out by the Alaska 
Department of Revenue staff provides useful publicly available information for 
developing realistic assumptions about potential prices and costs.  
Another element of controversy in the tax change is the claim by MAPA proponents that 
the new tax is more likely to increase future production, and, indeed, may already have 
increased oilfield investment over the level that would have occurred had ACES stayed 
in effect. It must be emphasized that independent empirical studies of the effects of how 
the tax change from ACES to MAPA might affect North Slope oil production do not exist. 
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Such studies would be very difficult if not impossible to perform because there are so 
many factors that could affect investment in oil exploration and development, all of which 
must be taken into account in order to isolate the effect of the tax change. Studies of tax 
changes in other places are not necessarily relevant to the change from ACES to MAPA, 
because of the unique features of these taxes and unique North Slope conditions. These 
unique features and conditions also make comparisons of tax takes between Alaska and 
other supposedly comparable areas potentially misleading and inaccurate. What one 
can do, however, is to analyze and compare the incentives offered by specific provisions 
of the different taxes. These incentives are related either indirectly or directly to the way 
each tax shares risk with the state.  
PROJECTING WELLHEAD OIL PRICES 
Web Note 17 described how to calculate the tax liability under MAPA and ACES. The 
focus here is on the assumptions for the various elements that make up the tax structure 
and could change over time. The old Alaska severance tax provides a useful starting 
point for the analysis. Under the tax in effect from 1981 to 2006, the tax was calculated 
as follows: 
 Tax = base rate * ELF * Wellhead production value 
Production tax returns are calculated separately for each taxpayer. However, the 
Economic Limit Factor (ELF) was calculated by field. The ELF was calculated from a 
nonlinear formula based on production per day per well. At high production rates, the 
ELF was 1.0, so the base tax rate of 15 percent applied to that field. As production per 
well declined, the ELF declined, reaching zero (tax-free status) when production fell to 
300 barrels per day per well for the field. Prudhoe Bay was the only field that ever had 
an ELF of 1.0, but the high production rate from Prudhoe Bay meant that the effective 
average North Slope tax rate for ELF-based tax remained fairly high for many years. As 
late as 1993, the average effective tax rate was 13.8 percent of wellhead production 
value. But as production declined from the Prudhoe Bay and Kuparuk fields in the 
1990s, the effective rate began a steady decline. By 2005, the average ELF was less 
than 0.5, yielding an effective tax rate of 7.1 percent of wellhead production value.8 
The wellhead production value for the production tax is defined as the wellhead price 
times taxable production. To obtain taxable production, one subtracts the royalty share 
from total production. For most Alaska North Slope leases, the royalty share is one-
eighth, but it is higher for some fields. Taxable production therefore typically averages 
somewhat less than the 87.5 percent of total production. 
To obtain the wellhead oil price, one subtracts transportation costs from the wellhead to 
market. Oil prices are notoriously difficult to forecast. Despite a veritable industry of 
consultants who are able to charge large fees to develop and package the most up-to-
date information on world oil markets, none of these forecasts can do better in projecting 
future oil prices than simply picking the current oil price.9 In other words, the best 
characterization of market oil prices is that they follow a “random walk” process, such 
that the most likely price at any given point in the future is the current price.  
Table 4 shows the actual North Slope average annual oil price and transportation costs 
for fiscal year 2013 and projected prices and transportation costs for fiscal years 2014 
and 2015. Alaska North Slope oil prices have been remarkably stable during the past 
                                                            
8  Data from Alaska Dept. of Revenue, Revenue Sources Book, various years. 
9  James D Hamilton, “Understanding Crude Oil Prices,” The Energy Journal, vol. 30, no. 
2: 179-206, 2009. 
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two years, varying between $100 and $110 per barrel. Transportation costs—pipeline 
tariffs to Valdez plus tanker costs—historically change relatively slowly from year to year. 
With average transportation costs amounting to just under $10 per barrel, the Alaska 
Department of Revenue projects that wellhead oil price during 2013-2015 will average 
$96.59 per barrel.  
 
Table 4. Alaska North Slope Actual 2013 and  
Projected 2014 and 2015 Oil Prices and Lease Expenditures. 
 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 average 
Price of ANS WC (in $/barrel) $ 107.57 $ 106.61 $ 105.06 $ 106.41 
Transit Costs & Other (in $/barrel) 9.76 9.9 9.82 9.83 
ANS Wellhead (in $/barrel) 97.81 96.71 95.24 96.59 
Deductible North Slope Lease Expenditures 
per taxable barrel 
   . 
  Operating Expenditures  17.39   19.64   18.05  18.36 
  Capital Expenditures   12.66   20.33   27.99  20.33 
  Total North Slope Expenditures   30.05   39.98   46.04  38.69 
Source: Alaska Department of Revenue, Revenue Sources Book, Spring 2014. 
http://www.tax.dor.alaska.gov/ 
 
ASSUMPTIONS FOR LEASE EXPENDITURES 
Since the ELF-based severance tax was replaced with the PPT in 2006, production 
taxes have been based on production tax value (PTV) rather than on the gross wellhead 
value, specifically,  
 Tax = (base tax rate * rate adjustment * PTV) - credits. 
Each version of the tax based on PTV had a different base rate, different rate adjustment 
mechanism, and different credits. However, all used the same basic definition of PTV. 
PTV is calculated by subtracting lease operating expenditures (OPEX) and capital 
expenditures (CAPEX) from the wellhead production value. In other words, PTV is a 
measure of before-tax cash flow accruing to the company from operating the lease. For 
both the original PPT and ACES, the rate adjustment was a “progressivity factor” that 
raised the tax rate above the base rate when PTV per barrel exceeded a defined 
threshold amount. For MAPA, there was no rate adjustment. However, a wide variety of 
new production qualified for gross value reduction (GVR), which reduces the taxable 
PTV by 20 percent of gross wellhead value (by 30 percent of gross wellhead value if the 
field royalty share exceeds one-eighth). The credits also differed between MAPA and the 
predecessor taxes (PPT and ACES). Under ACES and the PPT, the credit was a 
percentage of capital expenditures, generally 20 percent, while under MAPA, the credit 
was a specified dollar amount per barrel of production. Table 5 summarizes the base tax 
rates, rate adjustments, and credits of the three versions of the production tax based on 
PTV. 
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Table 5. Summary of Alaska Profits-Based Production Tax Terms 
 PPT (2006) ACES (2007-2013) MAPA (2014) 
Base tax rate 
(percentage of PTV) 
22.50% 25% 35% 
Rate adjustment 0.25%*PTV > $30 0.4%*PTV > $30; 
0.1%*PTV > $92.50 
for new (GVR) oil, PTV 
reduced by 20%*gross 
revenue 
Credit 20% of qualified 
CAPEX 
20% of qualified CAPEX $5/barrel for GVR oil; 
$8/per barrel, declining 
to $0 at $150/barrel 
wellhead oil price for 
other oil 
Minimum Tax 4% of gross wellhead 
value if oil price>$25 
4% of gross wellhead 
value if oil price>$25 
4% of gross wellhead 
value if oil price>$25 
Credits reduce 
minimum tax 
Yes Yes Yes, GVR oil; no, other 
oil 
 
Changing the tax base of the production tax from gross wellhead revenue to net 
production tax value complicated the task of revenue forecasting. Now projections of 
lease capital and operating costs were also required. Future lease expenditures that 
would be deductible from PTV, like future oil prices, are unknown and uncertain. Capital 
expenditures in particular are difficult to project, because they depend on company 
decisions to invest in new field development and exploration. Because ACES and its 
predecessor PPT allowed a tax credit for capital expenditures, projecting revenues for 
these taxes also required separate estimates of capital and operating costs. 
Not even the oil companies know what other firms will spend in Alaska. However, the 
Alaska Department of Revenue does have an advantage for making relatively short term 
forecasts due to its access to confidential tax returns for all firms operating in Alaska. 
These returns may provide insight into plans over the next three to five years. 
Department staff publish projections of total area-wide lease expenditures with revenue 
forecasts. Although production taxes, and therefore the relevant lease costs, are 
calculated separately for each taxpayer, average values will not represent the true 
situation for any particular company, and the nonlinear tax structure means that the 
average tax rate of all taxpayers’ individual returns will also differ from the tax calculated 
from the average values. ACES’ progressive rate structure causes the average per 
barrel tax on PTV to exceed tax on the average PTV per barrel. Revenue projections 
based on average PTV per barrel will therefore slightly understate revenue from ACES 
relative to MAPA. Nevertheless, taxes estimated with North Slope average wellhead oil 
prices and lease costs provide useful benchmarks and will closely follow actual tax 
collections. 
In addition to the wellhead oil price averages, Table 4 also shows actual operating and 
capital expenditures for fiscal Year 2013 and Department of Revenue projections for 
lease expenditures for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 that can be deducted from PTV. What 
stands out from the table is that while operating costs are relatively constant over time, 
capital expenditures vary widely. In particular, projected capital expenditures per barrel 
for fiscal year 2015 are more than double the expenditures recorded in 2013. The major 
reason for the increased capital expenditures projected for fiscal year 2015 is 
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development activity associated with the Pt. Thomson field. ExxonMobil expects to 
spend about $2 billion over the next two years, which amounts to about $5.50 per barrel 
produced over that period. 
It should be noted that the decision to develop Pt. Thomson and the associated 
expenditures resulted from a settlement of a legal dispute with the state that was 
unrelated to the contemporary production tax debate.10 Pt. Thomson is a special case 
because it is basically a huge natural gas field with a relatively limited potential to 
produce petroleum liquids until there is a market for North Slope gas. Developing the 
field requires a large capital investment per barrel of liquids production. If oil could be 
produced from the field with capital spending per barrel as low as from other North Slope 
prospects, the state would not have needed to sue Exxon to get it to develop the field.  
A good illustration of the effect of Pt. Thomson development on anticipated lease 
expenditures comes from Figure 4, which shows the Alaska Department of Revenue 
projections for lease expenditures after removing the effects of inflation, using their 
assumed rate of 2.5 percent per year. The figure shows that operating expenditures per 
barrel, adjusted for inflation, are relatively constant over time, while capital expenditures 
are much more volatile. The temporary increase in capital spending for fiscal years 2015 
and 2016 is readily apparent in the figure. Exxon has announced plans to begin 10,000 
barrels per day of production in 2016, which is reflected in the Department of Revenue 
production and revenue forecasts.  
Figure 4. 
Actual 2013 and Projected 2014-2019 Inflation-
Adjusted North Slope Lease Expenditures
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10  Elwood Brehmer, “Point Thomson-TAPS connection complete,” Alaska Journal of 
Commerce, June 5, 2014. http://www.alaskajournal.com/Alaska-Journal-of-Commerce/June-
Issue-2-2014/Point-Thomson-TAPS-connection-complete/ (accessed June 14, 2014). 
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COMPARING GOVERNMENT TAKE 
The Alaska Department of Revenue forecasts contain the best publicly available 
information about North Slope capital and operating expenditures over the next 3-5 
years. Using assumptions derived from these published projections offers the best 
strategy for comparing the effects of different tax regimes. Development decisions for 
new fields such as Pt. Thomson that would come into production within the next five 
years involve substantial capital expenditures, and be large enough to have a significant 
effect on operating expenditures, have likely already been made. Projections of lease 
expenditures beyond 5 years, not to mention projections of wellhead oil prices and 
production volumes, are much more uncertain and therefore less useful for comparing 
tax instruments, the effects of which depend on lease expenditures as well as production 
rates and prices. 
Figure 5 projects revenues over the next five state fiscal years from the three production 
tax regimes based on production tax value: MAPA (2014), ACES (2007-2013), and PPT 
(2006). The projections all use the same assumptions for oil production, prices, and 
lease expenditures, shown in Table 6. These assumptions are all derived from 
Department of Revenue forecasts. Lease expenditures represent published area-wide 
projections from the Fall 2013 forecast—the latest currently available—adjusted to 
estimate deduction from PTV using the percentage of total capital and operating 
expenditures that the department projects will be deducted in fiscal years 2014 and 
2015. Oil price and production forecasts, including production of new (GVR) oil are also 
those of the Department of Revenue. The five-year totals are not adjusted for inflation or 
discounted. Making these adjustments would change the total numbers but have no 
effect on the relative magnitudes. 
 
Table 6. Assumptions for Revenue Projections Comparing Different Production Taxes 
 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 
Total production (barrels/day) 498.39  487.64   482.72  459.49  429.09  
GVR production (barrels/day) 37.6 37.9 47.6 46.9 41.7 
West coast price $105.06  $107.69  $110.38  $115.40  $121.19  
Transport Cost  $   9.82   $   9.82   $ 10.06   $ 10.34   $ 10.78  
Royalty share 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 
CAPEX per taxable barrel  $ 28.17   $ 27.26   $ 22.35   $ 20.63   $ 24.59  
OPEX per taxable barrel  $ 17.87   $ 18.54   $ 18.76   $ 20.74   $ 20.64  
Source: Alaska Department of Revenue, Revenue Sources, Fall 2013, and Spring 2014. 
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Figure 5. 
Total Tax Revenues, Fiscal Years 2015-2019, Projected with Three 
Production Tax Regimes
 Applying Alaska Dept. of Revenue Fall 2013 Price and Cost Projections
$10.7
$12.0
$10.2
$8
$9
$10
$11
$12
MAPA ACES PPT
Bi
lli
on
 d
ol
la
rs
 o
ve
r 5
 y
ea
rs
 
 
As shown in Figure 5, applying Department of Revenue assumptions for average North 
Slope prices and costs will generate a projected $10.7 billion under MAPA for fiscal 
years 2015-2019. If MAPA is repealed and ACES reinstated, the corresponding revenue 
estimate is $12.0 billion, or 12 percent more. ACES clearly generates more revenue 
under these assumptions, but the difference is relatively modest. A major factor holding 
down the difference between MAPA and ACES is the large capital expenditures related 
to Pt. Thomson development, much of which would be eligible for a tax credit under 
ACES—while the per-barrel production credit under MAPA would be much smaller. 
Interestingly, if the original PPT enacted during the administration of Governor Frank 
Murkowski were in effect, the projected state tax take would be about $0.5 billion lower 
than under MAPA. That tax also had a tax credit for capital expenditures similar to the 
credit in ACES, but lower tax rates (see Table 5). 
The difference between ACES and MAPA would have been much greater under the 
conditions prevailing in the historical period 2008-2013, when the high oil prices and 
resulting high PTV per barrel caused ACES’ highly progressive rate structure to 
generate high average tax rates. MAPA, which lacks the investment tax credit of ACES, 
collects more in years of high investment (such as projected for FY15 and FY16), while 
ACES collects more otherwise. The relative effects are clearly apparent when 
considering the progressivity of the different taxes. 
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COMPARING EFFECTS ON RISK SHARING (PROGRESSIVITY) 
Both MAPA and ACES are progressive. ACES (and the PPT before it) have progressive 
rate structures based on changes in PTV driven by changes in capital and operating 
costs per barrel as well as wellhead oil prices. Progressivity in MAPA, however, is limited 
to changes in the per-barrel production credit rather than the tax rate on PTV. 
Consequently, MAPA progressivity is greater with respect to changes in oil prices than it 
is with respect to changes in costs. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the progressivity of ACES 
and MAPA with respect to oil prices, showing the effective tax rates as a percentage of 
PTV and as a percentage of gross wellhead revenue, respectively. Dr. Goldsmith 
discussed and illustrated this progressivity in Web Note 17, but the figures here differ by 
using actual 2013 and projected 2014 and 2015 deductible capital and operating costs 
per barrel from the Department of Revenue Spring 2014 forecast. 
Using these cost figures, ACES always collects more revenue than MAPA for legacy 
fields if oil prices exceed $70 per barrel. MAPA collects about the same revenue as the 
2006 PPT for legacy fields, but is clearly much less progressive. MAPA collects more 
than the PPT did when oil prices fall between $75 and $125 per barrel. The stair-stepped 
effective rate for MAPA reflects the ratcheting down of the per-barrel tax credit for legacy 
fields as oil prices reach the various threshold levels. 
The MAPA effective tax rate for new fields (GVR oil) is much lower. This currently has 
relatively little impact on MAPA revenues, but the effect will steadily increase as new 
development takes place and legacy fields continue to decline. Figures 6 and 7 also 
show the effective tax rate for the old severance tax in 1993, when the effective tax rate 
was 13.8 percent of gross revenue, as well as the year before it was replaced by the 
PPT, when revenues were lowest. These two figures provide useful benchmarks for 
comparing the taxes based on PTV. The regressive effects of the ELF-based tax are 
clear in Figure 6. The figures show that at the average wellhead oil price projected for 
fiscal years 2013-2015, new oil qualifying for the 20 percent GVR would provide only a 
little more revenue per barrel than the old severance tax when it reached its lowest 
effective rate, about 7 percent per barrel. Oil qualifying for the 30 percent GVR would 
pay even less. Wellhead oil prices have to exceed $130 per barrel before new fields 
qualifying for the 20 percent GVR would pay as much per barrel as the old severance 
tax did in 1993, while for 30 percent GVR, the price would have to exceed $160. 
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Figure 6. 
Effective Tax Rates on Production Tax Value 
Assuming average projected FY13-15 lease costs
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Figure 7. 
Production Taxes as a Percentage of Gross Revenue
Assuming average projected FY13-15 lease costs
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The $1.3 billion revenue difference in Figure 5 projected over the next five years 
understates the revenue difference for ACES over MAPA for those cost assumptions 
because it assumes oil prices remain relatively constant over the period. The only thing 
we know for certain about future oil prices is that they will fluctuate, even if the average 
price is similar to the average wellhead price projected for FY2013-2015. The 
progressivity feature of ACES causes it to collect somewhat more revenue relative to 
MAPA when oil prices exhibit greater volatility. If lease capital and operating costs are 
assumed to be the Department of Revenue average projected values for FY2013-2015, 
ACES would collect 6 percent more revenue if the oil price averaged $100 per barrel but 
fluctuated between $80 and $120, than if it stayed constant at $100. The older PPT, with 
somewhat less aggressive progressivity, would generate 4 percent more revenue, while 
MAPA revenues would be essentially unchanged. 
Figures 8 and 9 show how progressivity under MAPA is much less with respect to 
changes in PTV caused by changes in capital expenditures, especially for legacy fields. 
The figures show effective tax rates on PTV and gross revenue, respectively, with 
increasing capital expenditures per barrel. Since increasing capital expenditures results 
in lower PTV, progressivity is shown by a downward slope to the effective rate curve. 
The effective tax rates in the figure assume average wellhead oil prices and operating 
costs projected for the 2013-2015 fiscal years. The upward slope to the rate curves with 
respect to PTV for the old ELF-based severance tax indicates, again, the regressive 
nature of this tax. The figures illustrate the fact that if one uses FY2015 assumptions for 
capital expenditures, MAPA collects more, primarily because of the ACES capital 
expenditure tax credit. ACES collects substantially more in the other years, when capital 
expenditures per barrel were lower. 
Figure 8. 
Effective Tax Rates on Production Tax Value 
Assuming average projected FY13-15 wellhead oil price 
and operating costs
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Figure 9. 
Production Taxes as a Percentage of Gross Revenue
Assuming average projected FY13-15 wellhead oil price 
and operating costs
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Changing from a tax credit for capital expenditures under ACES to a per-barrel credit 
under MAPA has an additional effect on risk sharing beyond that arising from the 
reduction in progressivity illustrated by the flatter slopes of tax rates in Figures 8 and 9. 
The per-barrel credit in MAPA offers a tax benefit only if an investment is successful. 
That is the intended effect, of course. The result is to reduce investment incentives 
relative to ACES in projects for which production is uncertain. The firm receives the 
ACES investment tax benefit before it is known whether the investment will be 
successful. Typically the most uncertain investments, and therefore most favored by 
ACES over MAPA, are exploration investments.  
Furthermore, the argument that MAPA rewards production while ACES rewards 
spending is somewhat disingenuous. MAPA’s per-barrel credits are functionally 
equivalent to reducing the rate on PTV and adding a tax credit on lease costs. The 
ACES credit applies only to capital expenditures while the MAPA “credit” applies to 
operating as well as capital costs. For example, consider a simple case in which the 
wellhead price is $100 per barrel and operating and capital expenditures are each $20 
per barrel. ACES offers a tax credit of $4 (20 percent of $20) per barrel. Under MAPA, 
the field is eligible for a $5 per barrel credit. That $5 per barrel is also 5 percent of gross 
revenue per barrel, so a tax of 35 percent of PTV with a $5 per barrel credit is really a 
tax of 30 percent on PTV with a credit of 5 percent of total lease costs. An equivalent 
way of describing the tax in this case, therefore, is that it is a tax of 30 percent of PTV 
with a tax credit of 5 percent of capital and operating expenditures. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECTS 
MAPA introduces substantial tax relief for production from “new” fields qualifying for the 
gross value reduction (GVR). The difference in rates is large—nominally 7 percent of 
gross revenue for 20 percent GVR fields; it could be more or less depending on the 
effect of oil prices on the per-barrel credit for legacy fields. With such a large difference 
in effective tax rates, the oil companies clearly have a large incentive to try to qualify as 
much production oil as possible for GVR status. This places a significant new 
administrative burden on the Department of Revenue to determine the merit of these 
claims. The way the department makes these determinations—by developing and 
enforcing regulations—could change the nature of the administrative relationship toward 
either greater or lesser distance. If the state policy favors litigation of disputes, then the 
legal system cost of implementing MAPA could become significantly higher than it is 
today, as new oil takes on an increasing share of total production. On the other hand, if 
the state policy favors more negotiations and settlement of claims, then the cost will not 
rise much, but the public will be far less informed about these important taxing decisions.  
One frequently overlooked fact about MAPA is that the per-barrel allowance was 
designed to apply to oil, whereas the basic concept of a tax on production tax value 
could accommodate natural gas production just as easily as oil production. The change 
to MAPA therefore will put more pressure on the legislature to create a separate tax 
regime for large North Slope natural gas sales. 
INCENTIVES FOR INVESTMENT IN EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
As mentioned before, independent empirical evidence does not exist to show that the 
specific tax structure of MAPA would generate more investment than that of ACES. 
Studies of tax changes in other jurisdictions may not be that useful for comparing ACES 
to MAPA. During the recent period when oil high prices were very high and the 
progressive ACES tax rates collected a large share of North Slope revenues, investment 
in Alaska did not increase at the same rate as it did for other parts of the world. 
However, this earlier period may not represent likely future conditions. The booming 
world oil business caused by the high prices bid up costs for drilling rigs and other 
necessary inputs to oilfield operations. With these higher costs, PTV per barrel is now 
lower than it was a few years ago, even though oil prices remain high, reducing the 
difference in tax rates between ACES and MAPA. 
Lacking relevant empirical studies, the best information about likely effects on production 
derives from careful analysis of the specific incentive structure of the two taxes. While 
effective tax rates for ACES and MAPA differ relatively little at current PTV per barrel, 
the taxes have different effects on risk sharing (progressivity), especially considering the 
tax credits. The different credits cause the tax incentives to differ depending on the 
degree to which the source of uncertainty in future in PTV derives from uncertainty about 
the oil price or uncertainty about costs. 
The progressivity feature of ACES has often been portrayed as discouraging investment. 
However, the problem is not the progressivity of ACES per se, but rather that the 
aggressive increase in marginal tax rates when PTV exceeds $30 per barrel could lead 
to very high average tax rates. For example, a wellhead oil price of $130 and lease costs 
of $40 per barrel would generate a PTV of $90 per barrel, with an associated ACES tax 
rate of 49 percent of PTV. The rate structure is not adjusted for inflation. That is of 
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relatively little concern over the next several years, but it poses a serious problem for 
long-term planning.11 
 
Another important aspect of incentives concerns the timing of tax credits in the 
investment life cycle under MAPA and ACES. The 20 percent capital credit in ACES has 
been criticized for removing the incentive for firms to control costs for capital spending. 
The effect arises from the combination of the tax credit with the high tax rates on PTV 
when oil prices are high. With a PTV of $80 per barrel—in the example shown in the box 
below—and the associated tax rate of 45 percent on PTV, an additional dollar of capital 
spending reduces the production tax liability by only $0.03, considering the effect of 
increasing lease costs on lowering the tax rate as well as the tax credit itself. When PTV 
is close to $90 per barrel, the tax liability could actually fall by more than the investment 
cost. However, this situation arises because of the high progressive tax rates in ACES, 
not from the tax credit per se. 
PROGRESSIVE RATE STRUCTURE OF ACES  
When production tax value (PTV) falls between $30 and $92.50 per barrel, a $1 increase 
in PTV causes the tax rate to rise by 0.4% above the base rate of 25 percent of PTV. For 
example, consider the case where the wellhead oil price is $100, and capital and 
operating expenditures are each $20 per barrel. PTV is $60 per barrel, and the ACES 
tax rate is 25% + 0.4%*(60-30) = 37%. The tax liability is 37%*$60 = $22.50. 
Now suppose the oil price rises to  $101 and costs do not change. PTV is now $61 per 
barrel, and the tax rate is 25% + 0.4%*(61-30) = 37.4%. The tax liability rises from 
$22.50 to 37.4%*$61 = $22.81. The $1 increase in PTV caused taxes to increase by 
$0.31 per barrel. 
If the company reduces expenditures by $1 per barrel, the effect is the same as if the oil 
price rises by $1 per barrel. However, if the $1 cost savings represents a $1 reduction in 
capital expenditures eligible for a 20 percent tax credit, then the $1 reduction in capital 
expenditures would increase taxes due by $0.20 more, or $0.51 per barrel. 
As PTV per barrel increases toward the $92.50 upper threshold, the effect of the 
progressive rate structure on the ACES tax liability increases. At a PTV of $80 per 
barrel, for example, the tax rate is 25% + .4%*(80-30) = 45%, and the tax liability is 
45%*$80 = $36.00. A $1 increase in PTV per barrel dollar to $81, taxed at the new tax 
rate of 45.4% incurs a tax liability of $36.77. If the increase in PTV comes from a 
reduction of $1 per barrel in capital expenditures, there would be another $0.20 savings. 
The firm would pay $0.97 in additional taxes if it spent $1 less on capital costs, hardly an 
incentive to keep costs down. 
 
The tax base—PTV—is a measure of cash flow from North Slope operations. The tax 
liability for a firm in any given year arises from a combination of investment projects at 
different stages of their life cycle. Decisions to proceed with an investment project are 
based on that particular project’s contribution to overall profits. As viewed from a project 
basis, expenditures for exploration and development take place first. Production, if the 
                                                            
11  Companies considering investment decisions to develop new fields need to consider a 
20-30 year time horizon. If inflation averages a modest 2.5 percent per year and oil prices and 
lease costs just increase with inflation from average fiscal year 2013-2015 amounts per barrel, 
PTV in 30 years would be $90 per barrel, with the associated 49 percent tax rate under ACES. 
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investment is successful, arrives later—typically a number of years later. A dollar of 
credits for exploration or development expenditures contributes more to the project’s 
expected profits from a given investment than a dollar of credits for production. During 
the time between the capital spending and the return from additional production, the firm 
could have invested the money elsewhere. The cost of a year’s delay in receiving the 
return is essentially the firm’s cost of capital.  
The timing of giving the tax credit out also matters to the state, but the state’s 
opportunities, and therefore the state’s relevant cost of capital, are generally much less 
than industry’s. The cost of capital for an oil company would be based on pre-tax returns 
available from other potential investments in oil development, both in Alaska and 
elsewhere. The firm’s investment portfolio will generally have high expected returns and 
relatively high risk. The state has a different set of options. Changes in Alaska’s budget 
surplus or deficit would involve deposits or withdrawals from the Constitutional Budget 
Reserve and other state savings accounts. The portfolios of these accounts are mainly 
investment grade securities, which carry much lower risk and lower returns than oil 
company pre-tax investment portfolios. 
Because the cost of capital for industry is high, delaying tax credits from the time when 
exploration and development investments are made (ACES) to the time when production 
occurs (MAPA) reduces the value of the credit for stimulating new investment relative to 
the loss of revenue. Giving the credit now instead of later is better for the state, because 
oil revenues will likely be lower in the future than they are today. This does not mean 
that MAPA provides less overall incentives than ACES for new production. Rather, it 
means that the incentives MAPA does provide—through the per-barrel allowance and for 
new fields, the gross value reduction—are inefficient. Assuming the laws generate the 
same investments, a greater loss of revenue is required under MAPA to get the same 
benefit for new production. The per barrel credit in MAPA in essence gives companies a 
tax break for investments that they already made—in some cases many years ago. 
Figure 10 provides an example that illustrates the magnitude of the effects of changing 
the incentive for new production from a tax credit on capital expenditures to a per-barrel 
tax credit. In this example, the company considers spending $24 per barrel of reserves 
to develop a field with 100 million barrels of reserves ($2.4 billion total capital spending). 
Production starts in year 5, with 10 percent of capital spending in year 1 and the 
remaining 90 percent spread evenly in years 3, 4, and 5. The wellhead price is assumed 
to be $100 per barrel, and operating costs are assumed to be $20 per barrel. The cost of 
capital to the industry is assumed to be 10 percent, and the cost of funds to the state is 
assumed to be 5 percent. All figures represent real inflation-adjusted numbers. 
The figure shows that the value to industry of the ACES capital credit is somewhat lower 
than the cost to the state, because much of it is delayed several years and therefore 
discounted by a higher cost of capital. The nominal credit is $480 million, but the 
discounting causes it to have a present worth of $374 million to industry and $421 to the 
state. The per-barrel allowance is nominally worth $500 million (at $100 wellhead the 
per-barrel allowance is $5 per barrel for both legacy and GVR fields), but the delay in 
receiving it until production occurs causes it to be worth much less to the oil company 
today, as it contemplates making the investment in the field. The 20 percent gross value 
reduction likewise is spread out over the course of oil production, some of which is 
delayed until many years in the future. Because of the delay, the value to the company 
of both the per-barrel allowance and the 20 percent GVR adds to about the same as the 
20 percent capital credit under ACES. However, from the state’s perspective, the 
present value of the loss of revenue is about $200 million greater—almost 50 percent 
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more—with the two MAPA credits combined than from the ACES credit. Changing the 
incentive for investment from a tax credit on investment to a tax credit on production 
swaps an efficient incentive in terms of “bang for the buck” for an inefficient incentive. 
Figure 10. 
Present Value to the Company and Cost to the State:
 ACES Capital Credit vs. MAPA per barrel credit and GVR 
Example with 10 million barrels first year production, 1/8 royalty, 
10% decline rate, $100 wellhead price and $24/barrel capital cost
$- $100 $200 $300 $400 $500 $600
Value to company,
ACES 20% capital credit
Cost to state, ACES
20% capital credit
Value to company,
MAPA per barrel credit
Cost to state, MAPA per
barrel credit
Million dollars
Tax credit, all fields 20% Gross value reduction, new oil
 
 
The numbers generated in the example in Figure 10 are just illustrative of the general 
issue of timing of the investment incentives. Because small independent firms are likely 
to have fewer investment options and less ability to diversify risk, they will likely benefit 
more from the investment incentives offered under ACES than would large integrated 
producers. Of course, development has to be profitable before any production taxes are 
due under either ACES or MAPA. The reduction in MAPA of the ability of firms to 
monetize tax losses also affects small independent firms and new entrants to Alaska in 
general relative to the established producers.  
Conclusions 
MAPA as production tax legislation suffers from a number of significant drawbacks 
compared to its predecessors. The reduced progressivity of the effective tax rates 
increases the riskiness of industry investments on Alaska’s North Slope for any given 
after-tax expected return. The per-barrel credit in MAPA, despite its appearance as an 
incentive for increasing production, offers a very inefficient incentive for investment that 
would produce that new production. Effective tax rates for new (GVR) oil are quite low, 
meaning that the state take as a percentage of wellhead value is likely to decline over 
time, possibly to historic low levels. The creation of radically different tax rates for 
different oil fields offers a large incentive for industry to seek the most favorable 
treatment available, increasing administrative challenges and opportunities for conflict. 
ACES has many fewer problems. However, the one major problem that it does have—
high effective tax rates—could significantly hamper new investment. ACES has a very 
efficient incentive for new investment in the form of the 20 percent credit for capital 
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expenditures. But when the credit is combined with ACES’ high effective tax rates, 
incentives to control costs (and therefore maintain tax collections) are impaired. 
Progressive tax rates under the original PPT were significantly lower than under MAPA. 
The PPT had neither the high marginal rates of ACES or MAPA’s administrative 
complexity and inefficient incentives. Alaskans now must choose between keeping a 
flawed tax or reverting to a tax with different but considerable flaws. It is unfortunate that 
the original PPT is not an option on the ballot, as it arguably represents a better fit for 
Alaska’s production tax regime than either of the two current choices.  
 
